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Can a Password Stop Police From Searching
Your Cell Phone Incident to Arrest?*
by Adam M. Gershowitz
Associate Professor of Law,
University of HOllston Law Center

Over the last decade, cell phone use has exploded. Most
Americans now use cell phones that contain huge amounts
of information such as pictures, documents , music, text
messages, and emails. Not surprisingly, the fact that cell
phones are carried in public and hold enormous amounts of
data has made them attractive targets for law enforcement.
Numerous defendants have been convicted of drug dealing,
child pornography, and other offenses based on evidence
found on their cell phones .
In an earlier article, Adam M. Gershowitz, The iPhone
Meets the FOllrth Amendment, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 27
(2008), I explained how, under the "search incident to arrest doctrine," police can conduct warrantless searches of
ce ll phones when they an-est suspects for practicall y any
offense. So long as police have a val id reason to ,lIl'e~ t a
suspec t and fi nd a cell phone on his perso n or immed iately
nearby, the search incident to arrest doctrine should permit police to search the arrestee's phone, even if there is
no reason to believe the phone contains evidence related
to the anest. The only significant restriction on the search
of cell phones incident to arrest is that the search must be
conducted close in time, that is "contemporaneously," with
the arrest.
Although it is far from a routine practice , the number of
cell phone searches incident to arrest has risen dramatically
recently. Over the last few years, more than fifty cOUl1s

have been called upon to assess the constitutionality of
searching cell phones incident to arrest. And the vast majority of those cOUl1s have approved of the practice.
With so little judicial protection against warrantless
cell phone searches, this issue of SEARCH & SEIZURE
LAW REPORT explores whether individuals can protect
themselves by password protecting their phones. The value
of password protecting the phone depends on the answer
to three crucial questions . First, when police arrest a suspect and encounter a password-protected phone, can they
attempt to break the password themselves and unlock the
phone without the consent of the arrestee and without a
search wanant? Second , how long can police tinker with
the phone in an effort to gai n access to its contents? And
thi rd , il' police ca nnot crack the pa~s\I'ord on their 0\\ n, can
they reques t or even demand tha t tile ,UTestee tU nl over the
pass word withollt vi olnt ing the ,v/imlldo doctrine or the
Fifth Amendm ent protecti on against self incrimin ation?
The first question is relatively straightforward to an swer. Under case law predating the internet, police are permitted to break into containers to search them incident to
arrest. Courts have regularly upheld searches where police
have unlocked or broken into locked glove compartments,
briefcases, and even locked safes during searches incident
to arrest. Accordingly, there is a strong argument that, incident to a lawful an'est, police should be permitted to unlock
the cell phone so long as they can figure out the password
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in a short period of time following arrest. This should be
disconcerting to the millions of Americans who use simplistic passwords (such as "1234" or their birthday) that police can guess. And it should be worrisome to iPhone users
whose devices have weak password protection functions
that are vulnerable to tampering.
The second question - how long police can take in an
eff011 to decipher or bypass the password - is more com-

82

plicated. In an "ordinary" search incident to arrest, officers
must conduct the search contemporaneous with arrest.
Although there is no fIxed time limit, courts require such
searches to be conducted as soon as 'is pr~cticable and rarely tolerate lengthy drawn-out searches. This limitation is
deceiving in the context of cell phone searches however.
Supreme Court precedent provides that when police conduct the search of an item associated with the person of an
arrestee, such as his clothing or wallet, they can take far
longer to conduct the search and can comfortably do so at
the stationbouse rather than the scene of the arrest. When
a cell phone is found in an arrestee's pocket or attached to
his belt, a compelling argument exists that the phone is associated with the arrestee's person and that the police can
take hours to try to break the password, including by using
computer hacking software at the police station.
The fInal question - whether police can ask or demand
that an arrestee reveal or enter his password - also demonstrates how little protection arrestees have in their cell
phones. In most cases, before requesting a cell phone password, police should be obligated to read the arrestee his
Miranda rights. Yet, failure to read the warnings will not
result in suppression of any illegal evidence found on the
cell phone because the fmit of the poisonous tree doctrine
never applies to Miranda violations.

... Supreme GOUlt precedent
seemingly gives police authority
to spend hours trying to crack the
password at the scene or in the
comfort of the police station
If police demanded (rather than requested) that an arrestee disclose his password, the arrestee would have only
a very weak argument that the police have compelled a
testimonial response in violation of the Fifth Amendment's
Self Incrimination Clause. Moreover, even if the self-incrimination privilege theoretically existed in this context,
few criminal defendants would be savvy enough to invoke
the protection. And innocent individuals who have nothing
illegal on their phones (and thus no evidence to suppress)
will be unable to bring civil rights lawsuits because recent
Supreme Court caselaw limits Fifth Amendment remedies
to "criminal cases," not situations where the police fInd no
evidence and the individual is allowed to go on his way.
This issue of SEARCH & SEIZURE LAW REPORT
paints a grim picture of the privacy of arrestees' cell
phones. Police have wide authority to search phones incident to arrest, even if the arrest has nothing to do with the
phone itself, and even if the phone is password-protected.
Because cell phones are typically found on an arrestee's
person, Supreme Court precedent seemingly gives police
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authority to spend hours trying to crack the password at the
scene or in the comfort of the police station. And because
many Americans choose overly simplistic passwords and
certain cell phones can easily be hacked, there is a chance
that police can break into the phone without any help from
the arrestee. If police were to request the password from
the arrestee, the Miranda doctrine provides only nominal
protection because defendants rarely invoke it and police
violation of the rule does not lead to the suppression of evidence. Only if police demand that an arrestee provide his
password, can he make out a plausible (though still very
weak) Fifth Amendment claim.

Supreme Court's "standard" search
incident to arrest doctrine

('l
. /

The starting point for today's broad search incident to
arrest doctrine is the Supreme Court's 1969 decision in
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). In Chimel, the
Court suppressed evidence found when police searched
Chime!'s entire home, including his attic and garage, following an arrest for burglary. Despite suppressing the evidence, the Chimel decision provided broad authority for
the police to search incident to arrest. The Court held that
contemporaneous with a lawful arrest, police could search
for weapons that an arrestee could use against the officer
and to prevent an arrestee from concealing or destroying
evidence. The Court limited the scope of the search to the
arrestee's person and the area within his immediate control from which he might gain possession of a weapon or
destroy evidence. Thus, while police could not rummage
through Chime],s entire house following arrest, they were
free to search anywhere on his person or his immediate
grabbing space.
A few years after Chillle!, in U.S. 1', Robinson, 414 U.S.
21 X (1973). the COl1l1 moved a "cr tllrthcr and clarified
that police could open closed containers when searching
incident to arrest. Police alTested Robinson for the clime of

()

operating a motor vehicle with a revoked license. During a
search incident to arrest of Robinson's person, the arresting officer felt an object in Robinson's coat pocket but was
unsure of what it was. The officer reached into the pocket
and pulled out a crumpled up cigarette package. Still unsure what was in the package, the officer opened it and
discovered capsules of heroin. Even though Robinson was
not initially arrested for a drug crime and the officer had
no reason to believe the package in his pocket .contained
drugs, the Supreme Court upheld the search.
The Court announced a bright-line rule for searches incident to arrest pennitting police officers to open and search
through all items on an arrestee's person, even if they are
in a closed container, and even if the officers have no suspicion that the contents of the container are illegal. Put differently, the Court in Robinson clarified that the search incidentto arrest doctrine is automatic and that COUl1s should
not conduct case-by-case inquiry to determine whether
there was any suspicion or whether the search was truly

© 20 I I Thomson Reuters

November 2011

Volu~e

38, Number 10

necessary to protect the officer or prevent the destruction
of evidence.

Searching cell phones incid~nt to arrest
As wireless technology has become ubiquitous, law
enforcement officers quickly recognized that drug dealers
could use cell phones to text their drug transactions without
having to speak on the phone. Accordingly, police began to
search cell phones incident to arrest and courts were called
upon beginning in the mid-2000's to assess the constitutionality of such searches.
Although it is impossible to know how many cell phone
searches have been conducted incident to arrest over the
last few years, the number is likely in the thousands. In
many instances, police likely found nothing incriminating
and in other cases defendants likely plead guilty without
challenging the constitutionality of the searches. Nevertheless, more than fifty defendants have challenged the warrantless search of early generation cell phones over the last
few years and courts have upheld the searches in the vast
majority of cases. For instance, in U.s. v. Finley, 477 F.3d
250, 259-60 (5" Cir. 2007), the court upheld a search of
text messages because "police officers are not constrained
to search only for weapons or instruments of escape on the
arrestee's person; they may also, without any additional
justification, look for evidence of the arrestee's crime on
his person in order to preserve it for use at trial."
Dozens of other courts have reached the sarne conclusion. See, e.g., People v. Diaz, 244 P.2d 501 (Cal. 2011);
U.S. v. Pineda-Areola, 2010 WL 1490369 (7" Cir. 2010);
U. s. v. Fuellfes, 2010 WL 724186 (II" Cir. 2010); U.S. v.
Murphy, 552 FJd 405 (4" Cir. 2009); Silvan Iv. v. Briggs,
2009 WL 159429 (lO,h Cir. 2009); U. S. v. Faller, 681 F.
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Supp.2d 1028 (ED. Mo. 2010); Newhard v. Borders, 649
F. Supp.2d 440 (W.o. Va. 2009); U.S. v. WI,rie, 612 F.
Supp.2d 104 (D. Mass. 2009); Brady v. Gonzalez, 2009
WL 1952774 (ND. III. 2009); U.S. v. Quintana, 594 F.
Supp.2d 1291 (MD. Fla. 2009); U.S. v. McCray, 2009 WL
29607 (SD. Ga. 2009); U.s. v. Gates, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis
102989 (D. Me. 2008); State v. Harris, 2008 WL 4368209
(Ariz. App. Div. 1 2008); U.S. v. Santillan, 571 F. Supp.2d
1093 (D. Ariz. 2008); U.S. v. Deans, 549 F. Supp.2d 1085,
1094 (D. Minn. 2008); U.S. v. Valdez, 2008 WL 360548
(ED. Wis. 2008); U. S. v. Cuny, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5438 (D. Me. 2008); U.S. v. Dennis, 2007 WL 3400500
(ED. Ky. 2007); U.S. v. Lottie, 2007 WL 4722439 (ND.
Ind. 2007); U. S. v. Mercado-Nova, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1271
(D. Kan. 2007); U.S. v. Zamora, 2006 WL 418390 (ND.
Ga. 2006); U.s. v. Murphy, 2006 WL 3761384 (W.o. Va.
2006); U.S. v. Diaz, 2006 WL 3193770 (ND. Cal. 2006);
U.S. v. Cote, 2005 WL 1323343 (ND. Ill. 2006); U.S. v.
Brookes, 2005 WL 1940124 (D. VI. 2005); U.s. v. Parada,
289 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (D. Kan. 2003).
Although the Finley decision has been cited repeatedly
as the leading case on the search incident to arrest of early
generation cell phones, a small number of courts have refused to follow its reasoning. For instance, in State v. Smith,
920 N.E2d 949 (Ohio 2009), the Ohio Supreme Court, in a
closely divided opinion, refused to accept the crucial premise that cell phones are just like any other container that
might hold other objects inside. The majority ruled that
the search incident to arrest doctrine should not apply to
cell phones because even basic cell phones "are capable of
storing a wealth of digitized information Wholly unlike any
physical object found within a closed container."
Other courts have rejected the search incident to arrest
of cel1 phones that OCCUlTed too long after an-est to be contemporaneous. See. e.g., U.S. v. Fark, 2007 WL 1521573
(ND. Cal. 2007); U.S. l'. LaSalle, 2007 WL 1390820 (D.
Hawaii 2007); COllllllollwealth v. Diaz, 2009 WL 2963693,
(Mass. Super. Ct. 2009).
In sum, there are a growing number of instances in
which police have searched cell phones incident to arrest.
And while a few courts have rejected such searches on privacy and contemporaneousness grounds, the ovenvhelming majority of courts have upheld the searches. Because
it is unclear whether the Supreme Court will step into this
area of law and it is unlikely that legislatures will provide
much statutory protection, it will be· left to cell phone
users themselves to protect against warrantless searches.
The most plausible option is for cell phone users to password protect their phones.

Police can search locked containers
incident to arrest
If a cell phone user has protected her phone with a
strong password that combines letters, numbers, and symbois, the chances of police randomly guessing the password should be slim. Yet, password protecting a phone

I
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does not cloak it in impenetrable Fourth Amendment
protection. Password protecting a phoneds equivalent to
locking a closed container and lower courts have upheld
.
(
the searches of locked containers.
,

... password protecting a phone
does not cloak it in impenetrable
Fourth Amendment protection
Although the search incident to arrest doctrine has existed for over seventy years, the Supreme Court has never
clearly stated whether police are permitted to open locked
containers when searching incident to arrest. Nevertheless,
the Court's decision in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,
460-61 (1981), which authorized the search of the passenger compartment of a vehicle, broadly stated that police
could search "any" containers, whether "open or closed."
And the Belton dissenters clearly expressed their belief that
the decision extended to locked containers. In the years
since Beltoll, there has been a fair amount of consensus
among lower courts permitting police to enter locked containers as long as they do not irreparably damage them.
The most common example of police searching a locked
container is the search of vehicles' glove compartments.
For nearly three decades, courts have almost unanimously held that police may open locked glove compartments
during searches incident to arrest. See, e.g., U.S. v, Nichols, 512 F.3d 789,797-98 (6ili Cir. 2008); U.s. v. Gonzalez, 71 F.3d 819 (llili Cir. 1996); U.S. v. H00dy, 55 F.3d
1257 (7ili Cir. 1995); U.s. v. McCrady, 774 F,2d 868 (8 ili
Cir. 1985); People \'. P('l'ec.. 214 PJc1 502 (Col. A]1]1. 20(9);
HIII",,1 v. Stole. Y43 A.2ei 686 I Mel. Spec. App. 20(8); SlllIe
P. Church, 200S WIA947653 (Del. Super. Ct 2008); People v. Dieppa, 830 N.E.2d 870 (Ill. AppJd 2005); Slale v.
Brooks, 446 S.E.2d 579 (N.C. 1994); State v. Hanna, 839
P.2d 450 (Ariz. 1992); State v. Farr, 587 A.2d 1047 (Conn.
App. 1991); Lewis v. United States, 632 A.2d 383 (D.C.
App. 1989); Staten v. U.s., 562 A.2d 90 (D.C. App. 1989);
State v. Gonzalez, 507 So.2d 772 (Fla. Dist. App. 1987);
State v. F,y, 388 N.E.2d 565 (Wis. 1986); State v. Massenburg, 310 S.E.2d 619 (N.Co App. 1984); State v. Reed, 634
SW.2d 665 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982); Smith v. U.S., 435
A.2d 1066 (D.C. 1981)
Some courts have gone beyond glove compartments
to permit searches incident to arrest of even more secure
containers such as locked safes and footlockers. In U.s. v.
Thomas, 11 F.3d 620, 628 (llili Cir. 1993) the Sixth Circuit
approved the search incident to arrest of a locked twentypound safe that was contained in a tote bag and found on
the backseat of a pickup truck. Officers removed the car
keys from the truck's ignition and found the key to the safe
on the key ring. The court concluded that searching the safe
fell squarely within the search incident to arrest doctrine.

© 201 1 Thomson Reuters
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Similarly, an Illinois court upheld the search incident to arrest of a locked footlocker on the grounds that it was no
different than a locked glove compartment. See People v.
Tripp, 715 N E.2d 689,698 (Ill. App. 1999).
Courts have likewise permitted police to search locked
briefcases and overnight bags incident to arrest. One federal court even upheld the search incident to arrest when
police pried open the latch of a locked briefcase with a
screwdriver. See US. v. Howe, 313 F. Supp. 2d. 1178 (D.
Utah 2003).
Courts have been less consistent in cases where police
have tampered with the structural integrity of the passenger
compartment of the vehicle. As a general rule, courts have
forbidden police from dismantling the interior of the vehicle when searching incident to arrest. Thus, courts have
suppressed evidence where police have removed a vehicle
seat or dismantled the tailgate when searching incident to
arrest. See DAVID S. RUDSTEIN ET AL., CRlMINAL
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2.o6[4][bj (2009). Yet, even
in the face of this logical rule, a number of lower courts
have given police leeway to conduct searches incident
to arrest of sealed areas. For example, the Eighth Circuit
upheld the search incident to arrest of the space between
the window's rubber seal and the door panel. See US. v.
Bames, 374 F.3d 601,604 (8- Cir. 2004).
Although it is difficult to state a rule that explains all
of the cases, when assessing the search incident to arrest
of locked or sealed containers three key principles can be
ascertained. First, courts almost always permit police to
utilize a key to unlock containers. Second, when no key
is available, some courts have approved of police physically breaking locks to enter the container, although the
COUl1S have offered no detailed analysis justifying their
decisions. Finally, when dealing with sections of the passenger compartn"lcnt of a vehicle that can easily be disassembled (such as gear shift covers or removable radios),
courts have seemingly embraced a version of the slogan
"you break it, you buy it" and upheld the searches as long
as officers did not damage the vehicle. It is only when
police have broken items or dismantled major sections of
the vehicle that courts unequivocally reject the search incident to arrest doctrine.

Searching a locked (password protected)
phone is permissible
Based on this case law, it would seem clear that police
can attempt to crack a cell phone password during a search
incident to arrest. Just as police are permitted to try all of
the keys on the defendant's keychain until locating the one
that unlocks the glove compartment, police should be able
to try multiple different combinations in an effort to discover the password to the phone.
Of course, there is still a limit on the manner in which
police can conduct the search incident to arrest. As with
tangible objects like an automobile, police should be cabined by a rule forbidding them from destroying an object in
© 20 I I Thomson Reuters
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order to search it incident to arrest. Many cell phones contain a function that deletes the contents of'the phone if the
password is incorrectly entered a ,ertain number of times
in a row. If the phone alerted the offlcer\that another incorrect password entry would erase the contents of the phone,
police should not be permitted to make that final guess.

Attempts to break passwords must be
contemporaneous with arrest
In ascertaining how long police can spend trying to
crack a password, the best place to begin is the question of
whether cell phones are items irurnediately associated with
the arrestee or merely possessions near the arrestee. This
distinction requires us to parse two Supreme Court cases
from the 1970s.
In the somewhat obscure Supreme Court case of US.
v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974), police arrested Edwards
at II pm for attempting to break into a government building. Edwards was promptly brought to jail, processed, and
placed in a cell. Overnight, police discovered that the perpetrator had attempted to enter a wooden window and that
he would likely have paint chips from the window on his
clothing. The following morning, ten hours after his arrest, police took Edwards' clothing from him to search for
paint chips. Edwards moved to suppress the evidence on
the grounds that the search of his clothes occurred too long
after arrest to fall within the search incident to arrest exception. The Court rejected Edwards' argument and gave police wide authority to conduct the search incident to arrest
well after the arrest was conducted.
Three years later, in the far more famous Supreme Court
case of U.S. v. C/wdll'ick, 433 U.S. I (1977), officers aITestcd Chadwick as he was trying to load a double-locked footlocker into his vehicle. One set of ag('nts hrought Chadwick
to a federal building and another group of agcllt" followcd
behind with the footlocker. Approximately ninety minutes
after the atTest, federal agents opened the footlocker and
discovered a large quantity of marijuana.
Unlike in Edwards, the Supreme Court rejected the Goverument's argument that the footlocker could be searched
incident to arrest. In a brief footnote, the Court distinguished Edwards by explaining that "[ujnlike searches of
the person, searches of possessions within an arrestee's immediate control cannot be justified by any reduced expectations of privacy caused by the arrest." The Court further
explained that "[0 jnce law enforcement officers have reduced luggage or other personal property not immediately
associated with the person of the arrestee to their exclusive
control, and there is no longer any danger that the arrestee
might gain access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that property is no longer an
incident of the arrest."
The Court's decisions in Edwards and Chadwick thus
offer two different rules for the temporal scope of searches
incident to arrest. If the search is of items associated with
the person, police have great flexibility and can conduct

85
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the search many hours after arrest. If, however, the police
search possessions that are not associated with person and
are merely nearby, then there is a more rigid time limitation.
In the three-and-a-half decades since Edwards and Chadwick have been decided, the Supreme Court has offered no
additional guidance. There are, however, a few relatively
clear principles that can be deciphered from lower court
decisions.
Lower courts have repeatedly concluded that, in addition to clothing, police may also search wallets incident
to arrest at the stationhouse. See, e.g., U.S. v. Rodriguez,
995 F.2d 776,778 (7" Cir. 1993). Courts have concluded
that wallets fall under Edwards because they are typically
found on the arrestee and are thus much closer to a person's
clothes than a footlocker. Similarly, courts have upheld stationhouse searches incident to arrest of purses, dufflebags,
and backpacks because they appeared to more closely resemble items on the person rather than nearby possessions
like the footlocker in Chadwick. As Professor Wayne LaFave has observed in his influential treatise, courts have
"rather consistently" held that under Edwards police can
search incident to arrest the "pockets, wallet, [and] other
containers on the person" at the stationhouse following arrest. See 3 WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE:
A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 5.3(a}
at 146-47 (4" ed. 2004).
When a cell phone is found in an arrestee's pocket, precedent strongly suggests it should be treated like a wallet or
any other item on the person that is searchable for hours
after the arrest at the stationhouse under Edwards. A number of lower courts have reached this conclusion. See U.S.
v. Fillley, 477 F,3d 250 (5" Cir. 2007); U.s. v. kfurphy, 552
F,3d 405. 412 (4'" Cir. 2009):
v. H'lIrie, 612 F, Supp.
2e1 104 (D. Mass. 2009): U.S. v. ClIrry, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS S,BS, at '24-27 (D. Me. 2008): U.S. v. Diaz. 2006
WL 3193770 (ND. Cal. 2006), at *4; People v. Diaz, 81
Cal.Rptr.3d 215,217-18 (2008). BUI see U.S. v. Park, 2007
WL 1521573 (ND. Cal. 2007) (concluding that cell phones
should fall under Chadwick because they contain an enormous amount of information).

u.s.

If cell phones are merely possessions,

how long can police spend searching
them before the search ceases to be
contemporaneous?
If a court rejects the contention that the phone falls under Edwards and instead finds Chadwick controlling, police will have far less time to search it incident to arrest.
Although the Supreme Court has trumpeted the need for
bright line rules in the search incident to arrest context, the
Court has refuSed to adopt a bright line rule dictating how
long police can take to conduct searches under Chadwick.
Not surprisingly, lower court decisions often appear to be
completely inconsistent with one another.

86

While courts have refused to draw bright line time limits
on searches incident to arrest, the contours 'of the caselaw
does suggest that there is an outer time limit. It is easy to
locate hundreds of (non-cell phonei cas".s in which courts
permitted searches incident to arrest five, ten, twenty, and
even sixty minutes, after arrest. See Modern SWillS of
Rule As To Validity of NOllcollsensllal Search and Seizure
Made Without Warrant After Lawful Arrest As Affected By
Lapse of Time Between, or Difference in Places of, Arrest
alld Search, 19 A.L.R.3d 727 (1968). But very few cases
involve searches more than an hour after arrest. See, e.g.,
People v. Landry, 80 Cal. Rptr. 880 (Cal. App. 1969) (rejecting search occurring one hour and fifteen minutes after
arrest). The absence of such cases suggests that there truly
is an implicit outer limit on the time to conduct searches
incident to arrest.

Will police have enough time to crack
the password?
The key remaining question is whether, practically
speaking, police will be able to successfully crack a cell
phone password while complying with the time limits of
the search incident to arrest doctrine. The answer to this
question likely turns on where the cell phone is located
when the owner is arrested.

If the cell phone is found on an arrestee or in his pocket
it should be considered part of his person, giving police the
power to bring it to the station and search it for hours after
the arrest. If police discover a cell phone within the grabbing space of an arrestee, such as in a briefcase or lying on
the passenger seat of an automobile, they may search it but
typically must do so at the scene and likely within minutes
or at most an hour of an-est. Thus, police may have a short
p,-~riOlI of time to try tu crack the password of a cdl phonl'
fOllnd [lear an ancstee, and th~y may' have a considerably
longer period of time to crack the password of a cell phone
in the pocket of an alTestee.

If a cell phone must be searched on the scene and police
have only a few minutes to do so, the password will likely
prevent the police from accessing the phone's contents.
While some people use overly simple passwords such as
"12345" that police can guess, in most cases, police simply
will not be able to decipher the password during the commotion of an arrest.
In the cases where police bring the cell phone to the station house because it is part of the arrestee's person, the
chances of cracking the password increase dramatically,
particularly for certain phones. Take the iPhone as an example. The iPhone's password function offers three key
protections: (I) a four digit numerical code; (2) a requirement that consecutively entered incorrect passwords disable the phone for a short period before the user can try
another password, and (3) the option to have the contents
of the phone deleted if the incorrect password is entered ten
times. Unfortunately, these protections are extremely weak.
© 20 I I Thomson Reuters
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A four digit numerical code provides only ten thousand combinations. While this might prevent most human
guessing, it would not stop a blunt force computer program
that sequentially inputs every numerical combination. If
law enforcement utilized a very simple computer program
to try all ten thousand combinations in a row, they would
be able to crack the password in minutes. Wbile police stations likely do not currently have such programs at their
fingertips, it is quite possible they will in the near future as
technology becomes more ubiquitous.
Moreover, even if police never set up the program to
crack a password, they may be able to bypass the password altogether by hacking into the phone. Numerous
internet videos that show users how to access the data on
the iPhone. For some older versions of the phone, police
only need to tinker with the device itself to bypass the
password function altogether in a matter of moments. In
the comfort of the police station, police could therefore
gain access to the data on a passlVord protected cell phone
in a matter of minutes.

The iPhone meets Fifth Amendment
As detailed above, the search incident to arrest doctrine
provides police with the opportunity to guess or crack a cell
phone's password in an effort to search it. Wbat happens,
however, if police are unable to break into the phone on
their own? Can police ask or even demand that an arrestee
enter the password himself or verbally provide the password to the police?
As explained below, while the law is complicated,
in many cases police will be able to obtain the password
without mnning afoul of the Fifth Amendment. If police
request the password from an anestee who is in custody,
they have likely engaged in intelTogation that requires ;Hiranda warnings. Yet, hecause the fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine does not apply to evidence discovered as a result
of klironda violations, police can fail to comply with AIi~
ronda and suffer no consequences.

If anestees tum over their password in response to a
police demand (as opposed to a voluntary request), the arrestee can make only a very weak argument that the police
have violated the Fifth Amendment by compelling incriminating information. Moreover, many arrestees will never
reach this point because they will consensually relinquish
their passlVord well in advance of a police demand.

Miranda doctrine may protect against
requests for passwords, but violations
will not lead to suppression of
valuable evidence
For the Miranda doctrine to apply, an individual must
be in custody and subject to interrogation. The interrogation element is easily satisfied. When a police officer asks
an individual "What is your password? ," that inquiry is a
question that constitutes interrogation. Moreover, even if
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the officer is clever enough to avoid phrasing the matter as
a question (for instance, "please tell me the'password") the
Supreme Court has recognized that such functional equivalents of questioning amount to i1iterrogation if they are
designed to elicit an incriminating response. Accordingly,
requesting that an arrestee voluntarily tum over the password to his phone (which may inculpate him by leading to
evidence on the phone) amounts to interrogation.
The custody question is also fairly simple. Although the
Supreme Court has adopted different tests for determining
whether a person is under arrest and whether they are in
custody for Miranda purposes, it seems clear that an individual who has been formally subjected to a full-scale
custodial arrest is in custody for Miranda purposes. Thus, if
an officer requests the password to a phone during a search
incident to arrest, the arrestee is also in custody for Miranda purposes.
Yet, as in many other instances, the Miranda requirement is a hollow protection, because the fmit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply to Miranda violations. See
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985). While a confession
that violates Miranda wiII be suppressed, evidence found
thereafter will be admissible. Thus, if police obtain an arrestee's password in violation of Miranda, the statement
conceding knowledge of the password will be inadmissible, but the valuable resulting evidence - the incriminating
text messages or child pornography found on the phone will be admissible.

Police demands for password likely
do not amount to violation of Fifth
Amendment's self-incrimination clause
A final problem w0I1hy of attention is what happens if
police dern:lIld (rathl'r than rl'LJlll'st) that the arrl~stee pm~
viele his password and the arrestee cOlllplies out of a belief
that he has no choice. In this scenario, have police COJllpelled an ,UTestee to incriminate himself with a testimonial
response in violation of the Fifth Amendment's protection
against Self-Incrimination? Although the law is murky, the
answer is probably "no."
In order to assert a Fifth Amendment self-incrimination
challenge, an individual must demonstrate three things: (I)
that he has been compelled; (2) to produce testimony; (3)
that is incriminating. Taking the elements out of order, it is
simple to satisfy the incrimination requirement. Although
a password will almost never be incriminating by itself,
the information it protects often will be. For over half-acentury, the Supreme Court has recognized that the Fifth
Amendment protection applies not only to responses that
are themselves incriminating but also to information that
"would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to
prosecute the claimant." Hoffman v. U.S., 341 U.S. 479,
486 (1951). Thus, if providing the password leads to incriminating information, the element is satisfied.
It is also fairly easy to satisfy the "testimonial element.
Evidence is testimonial (and thus protected by the Fifth
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Amendment) if it causes a person "to reveal, directly or indirectly, his knowledge of facts relating him to the offense
or from having to share his thoughts and beliefs with the
Government." Doe v. U.S., 487 U.S. 201, 213 (1988). The
Court has recognized that most verbal statements "convey
information or assert facts" and therefore "[tlhe vast majority of verbal statements thus will be testimonial."
While the incriminating and testimonial elements are
satisfied, it is much more challenging for a defendant to
demonstrate the compulsion element. Ordinarily, when one
thinks of a person being compelled to incriminate herself,
it is not via police interrogation but instead in the context
of a grand jury subpoena. Indeed, when police officers interrogate a suspect they lack the legal authority to compel
the individual to say anything. As a result, it is not surprising that the only two cases in which defendants have been
compelled to disclose their computer passwords have been
in response to grand jury subpoenas. See U.S. v. Kirschner,
2010 WL 1257355 (ED. Mich. 2010); In re Boucher, 2009
WL424718 (D. Vt. 2009).
The idea that police cannot compel incriminating testimony is further supported by the Supreme Court's plurality decision in Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003).
In Chavez, a plurality of the Court concluded that an individual who had been inappropriately interrogated could not
raise a self-incrimination claim in a civil rights lawsuit because no criminal charges had ever been filed against him
and therefore he had not been forced to incriminate himself
in a criminal case in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Put
differently, while police might have compelled information from Chavez, they did not do so for Fifth Amendment
purposes because the protection against self-incrimination
applies only to testimony used in criminal cases.
rU!1hcr supporting the position that police cannot compc-J testimony is the fact that for the last century, cases alleging police misconduct during interrogations have almost
universally been analyzed under the klirnnda doctrine or
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment's due process
clauses, not the Self-Incrimination Clause.
In sum, a police demand for an arrestee's password can
certainly be testimonial and incriminating, but the self-incrimination claim should probably fail because the defendant is unable to demonstrate compUlsion. Accordingly,
an arrestee who turned over his password in response to
police demands has, at best, a very weak argument that his
Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination
has been violated.
Moreover, even if the self-incrimination claim were viable, most arrestees will never be in a position to assert it
because they will have revealed the password voluntarily.
If police simply ask, rather than demand, that an arrestee
consensually enter the password to his phone, there will
have been no compulsion and hence no Fifth Amendment

88

violation. At bottom, arrestees likely have little or no selfincrimination protection against police demands for cell
phone passwords.

Conclusion
Password protecting your cell phone is undoubtedly a
good idea. If the phone is lost, the password will help to
protect the data. And if you are arrested, the password will
make it more difficult for police officers to search the phone
incident to arrest. But password protecting the phone will
not necessarily prevent the police from bypassing the password and conducting a warrantless search of the phone.
As a legal matter, password protecting the phone provides virtually no additional protection against police
searching a cell phone incident to arrest. Longstanding
case law permits police to attempt to open locked containers when searching incident to arrest. Because cell phones
are often found on the person of an arrestee, police can
bring them to the station where computer savvy officers
can spend hours attempting to hack into the phone without
first procuring a warrant.

... password protecting the
phone provides virtually no
additional protection against
police searching a cell phone
incident to arrest
Moreover, even if police cannot decipher the password
{heir own, they stanJ a strong chance uf acquiring tht:
password from simple police interrogation. Requesting
the password would require police to give J\1iranda warnings, yet most individuals waive their iV/iranda rights
and, in any event, violations of Miranda do not lead to
suppression of evidence found subsequently. Arrestees
would likewise have little chance of successfully asserting a Fifth Amendment self-incrimination claim because
police are not judicial officers and lack the authority to
"compel" incriminating information in violation of the
Self-Incrimination Clause.
011

In sum, police have wide authority to search the contents of cell phones - including text messages, voicemails,
photos, internet browsing history, and reams of other data
- when searching an arrestee incident to arrest. Given that
password protecting the phone does little to curb police
power, the Supreme Court and legislatures should undertake efforts to scale back police power to search digital devices incident to arrest.
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